Increasing Citizen Demand for Good Government in Kenya*

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Abstract

In developing democracies, those living in poverty often have the numerical strength to demand government responsiveness but often do not do so. How can information campaigns prompt these citizens to take action? This pilot field experiment explores how variation in the content of an information campaign can impact political behavior in villages. The first intervention provides a report card detailing politician spending in constituency development projects, to see if villagers respond to unaccounted for money in locally visible projects. The second intervention couples the report card with a public participation flyer, to see if information about legal rights and decision-making processes is necessary for citizens to use the report card to take action. Political knowledge and attitudes appear unaffected by the materials, and the report card itself appears insufficient to impact behavior. Only when the report card is provided with information about public participation is there an increase in the local monitoring of public goods. Willingness to monitor local development projects managed by the politician appears to vary with social access to public leaders. The findings suggest that information campaigns can potentially prompt citizens with political connections to engage in monitoring a politician's performance in local development projects, even outside of election years.

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> "In democracy people tend to get what they demand, and more crucially, do not typically get what they do not demand."
>
> Amartya Sen (1999, 156) in *Development As Freedom*

1 Introduction

The poor are the most reliant on government services, and yet, the least likely to demand a more responsive government (Besley and Burgess 2002). Although they possess the electoral numbers to effect change in developing democracies, these citizens often end up supporting the very politicians that are rent-seeking from the public sector. Problems of high infant mortality rates, limited access to clean water, and low literacy and numeracy levels are aggravated by political leaders that act in their private interests rather than in the public interest (World Bank Development Report 2004). Political corruption, nepotism, or bribery with public funds is especially detrimental to the poor, as they cannot afford access to alternative private services.

The classic principal-agent model between government and citizens suggests that monitoring and sanctioning politicians for poor performance is essential for political accountability (Besley 2006). Spending leakage and low levels of effort by political leaders and their agents diminish the efficacy of the spending (Africa Development Indicators 2010). Why then, in developing democracies, do the poor not demand better performance from their political leaders?

Information can potentially enable citizens to demand better performance from their political leaders. The literature on information provision and public goods accountability in developing countries takes two general approaches. One focuses on the political leaders in charge and the extent to which voters will reward/sanction politicians for good/poor performance when equipped with information (Besley and Burgess 2002; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Banerjee et al. 2011; Humphreys and Weinstein 2012; Gottlieb 2012). The other focuses on how information can strengthen citizen monitoring of local public services (Banerjee and Duflo 2006; Reinikka and Svensson 2005). This study links the two literatures in examining how citizens can engage in the monitoring of local public goods provided by their politician, even in non-election years. While most studies of political accountability focus on voting behavior just prior to elections, this study proposes to investigate potential ways that citizens can hold their politicians accountable outside of direct elections.

A related literature looks at why citizens may not demand a more responsive government. Voters may prefer particularistic goods rather than public goods, especially when institutional capacity is inadequate. Clientelistic transfers, vote-buying, and targeted ethnic patronage are potential obstacles that can hinder accountability in public goods provision (Magaloni 2006; Wantchekon 2003, 2009; Kramon 2011). Weak and unresponsive institutions may lead citizens to feel disempowered or disengaged from the political process (Aldrich 1993; Chong et al. 2011). Moreover, when voters are exposed to information that is negative in tone and that attack government performance, it can potentially demobilize and alienate the electorate (Ansolabehere et al. 1994, 1999; de Figueiredo et al. 2011). However, the active monitoring of government by citizens is an essential component of political accountability, and may be especially important when the formal checks on politicians themselves are not there.

I use data from a pilot field experiment to explore what types of information can enable individuals to take action. The information campaign distributed a Constituency Development Fund (CDF) report card, which details the budgets of all the CDF projects allocated funding in the constituency for that fiscal year. It audits how much money is unaccounted for. For this particular report card, in fiscal years 2006/2007 and 2007/2008, Ksh. 10,891,951 out of Ksh. 65,721,783 (17%) and Ksh. 11,821,878 out of Ksh. 56,429,904 (21%) was unaccounted for.[1] The monthly average income of an individual in the randomly drawn sample of the constituency is approximately Ksh. 2187, with a median income of Ksh. 1500.

Constituency Development Fund projects are highly visible in the daily lives of Kenyans living in rural areas. It is the primary means through which the central government channels additional funding for school, dispensary, and water projects in many villages. Oftentimes, the school walls, dispensary signs, or water tanks will have "CDF" emblazoned in large bold letters, to indicate that the project was sponsored by the local Member of Parliament.

The first intervention, the report card, is motivated by the idea that citizens care the most about information that is relevant to their everyday lives. To this effect, the report names local projects and how much money was allocated, spent, and unaccounted for in each one. The second intervention, the report card plus a public participation flyer, is based upon the mixed findings in the literature as to how information can enable citizens to take action. The theory

[1]The exchange rate, when this study was conducted, was approximately 1 USD = Ksh. 85, meaning this amount unaccounted for is just over 110,000 USD.

proposed here is that citizens may be motivated to take action from the information in the report card, but unaware of what steps they can take to become involved. To address this, the flyer detailed the local decision-making processes and the legal rights of citizens to monitor and scrutinize government.

From this data, I find that the information campaign has minimal impact on political knowledge and attitudes, but that providing the report card and flyer can nevertheless increase the likelihood that individuals will monitor their local development projects. Although the sample is underpowered, it does provide suggestive initial evidence that information can shift political behavior in observable ways.

Previous studies have mixed findings as to the impact of information campaigns on political and public goods accountability. This study makes three contributions. First, I posit that information about performance may not be enough: Citizens may need additional information about local processes in order to identify potential ways to take action. Second, this study provides experimental evidence for how to potentially strengthen the second component of electoral accountability: Citizen monitoring of outcomes that their politician is directly responsible for. Most studies of political accountability have primarily focused on how information campaigns can impact political behavior in terms of voting. Lastly, I present evidence that suggests that personalized access to public officials can matter for citizens' willingness to monitor local development projects. I find that the effects of mobilization by the report card and flyer are especially large for individuals who are friends with a public leader.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 overviews the literature and outlines the theory, Section 3 describes the context of the study, the data, and the experimental design. The expected outcomes are specified in Section 4 and the findings are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.

2 Background

Government provides important public sector services of health, water, and education. However, corruption in government spending is rampant in many developing countries. In 2000, 70% of Uganda's government expenditures on healthcare were misappropriated, while in Tanzania it was 41% and in Kenya it was 38% (Africa Development Indicators 2010). Reinikka and Svens-

son (2004) develop the method of "estimation by subtraction" to measure graft, in comparing the government funds allocated with the funds received locally. In assessing capture by local officials and politicians in education, the authors find that 78% of government grants did not reach the intended schools between 1991-1995 in Uganda. The authors illustrate how graft in public spending on education appears to be a serious problem across contexts: 49% in Ghana in 1998, 57% in Tanzania in 1998, 78% in Uganda in 1995, and the weighted average of 60% in Zambia in 2001. Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2010) find a 100% marginal rate of leakage in the administration of India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, as almost none of the wage increase mandated at the national level actually reached the rural workers. The World Bank Development Report (2004) highlights the importance of citizen scrutiny in ensuring that the political incentives are there for adequate service provision and that public spending reaches the poor.

2.1 Political Accountability

Political accountability is premised on the idea that politicians are responsive to public demand. Besley (2006, 36) proposes a principal-agent model whereby elections act as an accountability mechanism that resolves the conflict of interest between the citizenry and those in government. However, this accountability mechanism is weakened by problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Information asymmetries can hinder voters from monitoring and sanctioning political leaders for lack of effort or diverting resources to private ends. Thus, the existence of formal accountability, an institutional structure that allows for the sanctioning of politicians for poor performance, does not guarantee real accountability.[2] Citizens need sufficient information to make the politicians responsive to their interests.

However, this places a large onus on the individuals to obtain information. The American politics literature suggests that generally, the masses are ill-informed about their political leaders and government (Converse 1964; Carpini and Keeter 1997; Kinder 2003; Bartels 2003). Informed voting is costly, as acquiring information guarantees not informed policy, but only a more informed vote (Fiorina 1990; Popkin 1995). In a developing country context, access to information is especially problematic, as limited infrastructure, poverty, government restrictions,

[2]This paper primarily refers to democracies, although Tsai (2007) suggests some level of accountability can exist even in non-democracies, when public officials are embedded in solidary groups and value moral standing.

and low levels of education can magnify the costs of access. Voters may use information shortcuts or heuristics to make inferences about government performance (Lupia 1994; Popkin 1995; Fiorina 1981). However, these shortcuts can potentially be unreliable and leave the electorate susceptible to manipulation by the political elite (Bartels 1996; Zaller 1992). Voters may not be able to distinguish between an incumbent acting in the public interest and one acting for private gains. In developed democracies traditional information providers such as professional data cleaners and publishers, interest groups, political parties, and government can alleviate the costs of the obtaining information about government performance (Downs 1957). However, in developing democracies limited infrastructure and weak institutional capacity often limit these traditional sources, and donor-funded civil society organizations and NGOs will often play a larger role in reducing access costs to this information.

Politicians may take advantage of informational asymmetries and low demand to engage in vote-buying and patronage as a campaign strategy when the income per capita of voters is low (Kramon 2011; Finan and Schechter 2012; Wantchekon 2003; Banerjee et al. 2011; Magaloni 2006).[3] Magaloni et al. (2011, 153) find that clientelism increases with levels of poverty in Mexico, in an inverse-J shape; a relationship that does not depend on measures of core support, electoral decline, or any other conventional measures of political competition.

2.2 Information and Accountability

Studies have shown that access to information can strengthen electoral accountability and government responsiveness across developing country contexts. Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2010) suggest that persistent political corruption in Brazil is better explained by an information constraint. Access to newspapers (especially in local languages) is associated with increased voter turnout and government responsiveness to natural disasters in India (Besley and Burgess 2002). Voters will turnout to punish politicians revealed to be corrupt through audits of mayors in Brazil, and select for better performing politicians in when equipped with information in slums in Delhi, India (Ferraz and Finan 2008; Banerjee et al. 2011). Also, voters are less susceptible to vote-buying when equipped with credible information by a neutral third-party in

[3] Although the strategies of politicians is not the focus of this study, they do have the potential to stimulate or suppress demand for accountability. Politicians may use strategies of coercion and intimidation to ensure that voters behave in the politician's interest, in a reversed version of political accountability (Collier 2009; Magaloni 2006). However, as this study takes place in one constituency during a non-election year, a comparative analysis of how different political strategies tie in to information constraints is not addressable here.

Benin (Wantchekon 2009).

But the conditions under which information campaigns can enable citizens to hold their politicians accountable are not clear. In a study that randomized the distribution of report cards on incumbent performance in urban slums in Delhi, Banerjee et al. (2011) find that the voters only react to performance information of politicians along dimensions that have a clear and direct connection to their well-being. Voters were able to infer the extent of incumbent spending in slums, even though these details were not provided as a part of the information campaign. Humphreys and Weinstein (2012) find that voters' attitudes are responsive to information about the legislative activity of their Member of Parliament, even in the presence of uncertainty about the mapping of legislative actions to outcomes. However, it does not appear that these changes in attitude affected electoral outcomes or politician behavior.

Moreover, a growing literature suggests that information campaigns can potentially undermine accountability by alienating citizens from the political process. In Mexico, Chong et al. (2011) find that information about the corruption of single-term mayors erodes partisan identification and causes voters to withdraw from the political process. In Brazil, de Figueiredo et al. (2011) find that negative campaigning in a runoff election, where they informed voters about both incumbent and challenger corruption, reduced voter turnout. In a supplemental survey experiment, the authors find that the flyer appears to reduce the salience of corruption in voters' decisions. This directly corresponds to findings in the American politics literature, which finds that negative political campaigns can demobilize the electorate and weaken political efficacy (Ansolabehere et al. 1994, 1999). Possibly, the reduction in turnout in Mexico and Brazil may be attributable to the fact that citizens had no means by which to hold their politicians to account.[4]

A related literature looks at accountability in public goods provision. Information campaigns can empower citizens to participate more within their communities, in demanding better health and education services. In Uganda, a newspaper campaign that published the monthly transfers of education grants in the national newspapers and their local language editions increased school enrollment and reduced misappropriation of government expenditures (Reinikka and

[4]In Mexico, voters were unable to directly sanction the mayors through elections, since they were single-term and not able to run for re-election. In Brazil, information about corruption scandals involving both candidates in the runoff election was distributed. Since the general voter decision rule that is presumed in the literature with regard to corruption is to elect non-corrupt incumbents (Ferraz and Finan 2010), voters perhaps had no alternative other than abstention to express disapproval.

Svensson 2005). An information campaign in Uganda that provided report cards about local health facility performance to communities and encouraged community-based monitoring found reductions in infant mortality rates and improved efforts at health service delivery (Björkman and Svensson 2009) In Madagascar, Nguyen and Lassibille (2008) find that report cards about local school performance, combined with educational resource inputs, led to improvements in student learning.

Similar to studies of voting behavior, these findings have also been mixed as to how information campaigns can improve accountability in public goods provision. Providing report cards about local school performance and information sessions about how to participate is not guaranteed to improve school performance or parental participation (Banerjee et al. 2010). Olken (2007) finds that anonymous comment forms reduced missing expenditures only when comment forms were distributed via schools and bypassed the village elite. Otherwise, community-based monitoring had no impact in reducing leakage and top-down audits were more effective.[5]

2.3 Potential Alternatives

Why might citizens not take action to demand better government provision of public goods? One alternative explanation is that citizens may value distributive or private goods over public goods provision. In contexts with weak institutional capacity, where the government's ability to deliver public goods is uncertain, some studies posit that citizens may prefer private goods because politicians cannot credibly promise to deliver public goods (Keefer and Vlaicu 2008; Kramon 2011; Wantchekon 2003, 2009).

Another potential explanation is weakened political efficacy. This is the framework is proposed by Aldrich (1993) and Chong et al. (2011) to explain why individuals may decide not to participate politically, as the costs of voting exceed the expected benefits. Friedman et al. (2011) find that being more educated and informed does not necessarily lead to more political participation, contrary to the theories explaining democratic attitudes and behavior, dating back to Lipset (1960) and Almond and Verba (1963). Rather, their findings are more in agreement with Huntington (1968) as to how unresponsive political institutions can potentially frustrate

[5] And in fact, in the villages where information was distributed by the village elite, the corruption indicated on the comment forms tended to be inversely related to the amount of actual corruption: " Thus, when comment forms were distributed via neighborhood heads, the comments received were more positive, even though missing expenditures were actually higher in these villages" (Olken 2007, 237).

democratic participation.[6]

2.4 Theoretical Framework

Low citizen scrutiny of politicians' actions increases their incentives to behave opportunistically with public funds, especially in a context where formal institutional checks are weak. Political accountability requires that citizens have adequate information to monitor politician performance. However, for those living on subsistence income, the costs of obtaining information can be extremely high. Lack of electricity hinders radio and television usage even if they can afford it. Unpaved roads prevent public transport access to towns, raise the time and monetary costs of travel, and restrict newspaper circulation to many rural areas. Can reducing the access cost of information enable citizens to monitor politician performance?

Existing literature yields an incomplete picture as to how information can empower citizens to take action. This study explores what information may be necessary to enable citizens to monitor and scrutinize politician spending on local public goods. My theory is that information about politician performance needs to: (1) be specific and identifiable in an individual's everyday life and (2) provide details as to how an individual might be able to participate in the political process. The two experimental interventions are designed to capture this intuition.

The outcome of interest is whether or not an individual takes action with regard to public services. I refer to these actions as citizen demand for good government. The first intervention builds on the literature in looking at whether or not citizens are responsive to specifics about spending in their constituency.[7] Moreover, there is a clear and institutional link of responsibility for the funds to the politician.[8] The second intervention is motivated by the idea that just providing report card about corruption may not be enough. A report card and flyer are distributed together, because it could be possible that individuals are motivated to take action but unaware of what steps to take. Information about legal rights and the decision-making processes may be necessary for individuals to ascertain potential ways to participate.

[6]The study was of young women who had participated in a randomized controlled trial of a scholarship program in Kenya. Specifically, they find that although human capital gains were associated with increased newspaper readership and increased autonomy at home, it did not translate into increased democratic participation–and in fact, appears to have increased the legitimization of violence.

[7]Ideally, we would be able to compare responses to spending across villages, but the limited sample of 9 villages limits this.

[8]Formally, by the CDF Act, fund management is the responsibility of the Member of Parliament. Moreover, the fund itself is called the "Constituency Development Fund", and MPs to will occasionally attach their names to CDF projects as well.

The project proposed here builds on Banerjee et al. (2011) in examining how information about politician performance in local development projects can prompt citizen participation in political processes. Expanding on their findings on voting, I expect for specifics about spending on local projects to impact political awareness and attitudes, and to prompt action with regard to these development projects.

3 Context of Study

Kenya serves as a representative model of a developing democracy with weak institutional capacity. It has had a multiparty system since 1992 and competitive elections since 2002, but legal checks and balances are weak.[9] Although Kenya is a relatively strong economic actor in East Africa, its economy is characterized by high levels of unemployment, high rates of poverty, and high inequality. Governance is hindered by patronage, corruption, and rent-seeking by many of the political leaders. For instance, it was recently revealed that the Ministry of Education "lost" Ksh. 4.2 billion in aid money intended to fund the Free Primary Education scheme across the country.[10]

This pilot project examines how villagers in rural Kenya respond to information about politician spending on Constituency Development Fund projects.[11] Currently, at least 2.5% of national government revenue is set aside for the Constituency Development Fund. The primary purpose of this fund is to target the development of schools, health facilities, and water projects in rural areas. CDF funds are given to every Member of Parliament (MP) to develop their constituency, through an allocation formula that favorably weights rural constituencies.

3.1 Constituency Development Fund

It is the MP's direct responsibility to manage CDF monies, according to the Constituencies Development Fund Act. The MP has sole discretion in appointing the committee that disburses the CDF funds for the local project proposals submitted by communities. Thus, when there is

[9] For instance, the Anglo Leasing scandal has yet to fully prosecute any of the main actors, despite substantial evidence. (The Daily Nation 2011a,b; The New York Times 2006; Collier 2009)

[10] Daily Nation, 16 June 2011. "Britain: Give us back our money". http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Britain++Give+us+back+our+free+primary+aid+/-/1056/1183864/-/view/printVersion/-/4g4jor/-/index.html

[11] According to the latest census, approximately 90% of Kenyans live outside of Nairobi, with 67% of Kenyans living in rural areas (Kenya Bureau of Statistics 2009).

politician turnover, there is also CDF committee turnover. There is limited central government oversight as to how monies are spent and no official budgetary audits of the funds allocated. The fund manager is appointed by the central government as the custodian of records and disbursements. However, the manager reports directly to the CDF committee that he/she is in charge of overseeing, which may limit effective monitoring and oversight.[12]

3.2 Constituency Development Fund Report Card

The National Taxpayer's Association (NTA) is a Kenyan civil society organization, funded by international donors, that has put together a Citizen Report Card for constituencies across Kenya.[13] The materials were kept in the original format that the National Taxpayer's Association usually distributes. The audit booklet uses estimation by subtraction to calculate unaccounted for money. It is in English and is 41 pages long.[14] For each government allocation of CDF project money in the audited constituency, the report card provides the project name and photo, budgetary data, and an engineer's assessment of quality. It provides specific and detailed information at the local level for projects that citizens can easily identify in their villages and surrounding areas. The method of data collection and assessment is detailed in the booklet.[15] Although the report card provides a technical assessment by an engineer for each project, the audit itself has no stance as to whether the politician is a good or bad performer, as it highlights both well-done and poorly-done projects across the constituency (see Appendix for examples). The distributed report card audits and lists all the CDF projects across Kangema

[12]From Open Society Initiative of East Africa (2008): The Constituency Fund Committee (CFC) is a parliamentary committee that oversees the nationwide implementation and systematic allocation of the CDF. The Board of Management (Board) is the central government board responsible for administering the fund and disbursing monies from the Treasury to each constituency. The District Projects Committee (DPC) ensures that there are not duplicate projects and is responsible for rare projects that span two constituencies. The Constituency Development Fund Committee (CDFC) is appointed by the MP to manage the CDF in the constituency. A new MP convenes a new committee within 60 days after taking office. A fund manager is appointed by the Board to be the custodian of all records and disbursements, and submits a monthly and annual report to the MP-appointed CDFC each fiscal year. The Project Management Committee is composed of public members (often, the ones that proposed the project) who manage and oversee and individual CDF project.

[13]The NTA is funded by DFID (UK Development Agency), GIZ (German Development Agency), and CIDA (Canadian Development Agency). The governing body consists of 12 Kenyan organizations: Transparency International-Kenya, Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, Center for Governance and Development, Kenya Private Sector Alliance, Kenya Female Advisory Organization, Private Sector Development Trust, United Business Association, Kenya Informal Sector Alliance, Kenya Alliance of Residents Association, Catholic Peace and Justice Commission, Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Kenya Private Sector Network.

[14]Approximately 43% of the sample could read English themselves, and 96% of the sample knew someone else could could read English. Less than 3% of the sample could not read English themselves and did not know someone else who could read English.

[15]They have never before attempted to disseminate the information to the village level, as it is costly and too difficult for them to logistically do so.

constituency for fiscal years 2006/2007/2008.

3.3 Sample Characteristics of Kangema Constituency

The study took place in 9 villages, randomly drawn from the 2009 census data for Kangema Constituency, in Murang'a County in Central Province. Table 1a lists the summary statistics. Approximately 65% of the respondents normally walk to the nearest town, and roundtrip time averages around 69 minutes. 93% voted in the past election and 22% identify with a political party (mostly the Party of National Unity). In terms of assets, around 79% own a mobile phone, 92% own a radio, and 29% own a television. About 86% of respondents reported that they listened to radio shows that discussed politics and 43% read the news (primarily the Standard and the Daily Nation). Almost all respondents knew the MP's name (99%).[16] These characteristics are balanced across villages in the sample.

The constituency is predominantly Kikuyu. Accordingly, the sample is 99% Kikuyu and the MP is Kikuyu; almost all voters are the same ethnicity as the MP. Tea and coffee are the primary cash crops. While rural, it is better off economically than many other areas in Kenya, with a comparatively low poverty rate of 28.5%. It has the eight lowest level of poverty in Kenya, according to the Kenya Bureau of Statistics 2005-6.

At the time of the project, John Michuki was the incumbent MP for four terms since 1992, with prospects of running for re-election. In February 2012, he passed away at the age of 80 from a heart attack.[17] Michuki was considered to be a ruthless but efficient politician and administrator, with paved roads visibly marking his efforts at development around the constituency.[18] He was educated at Oxford, a prominent figure in Kenyan national politics, and considered to be close to President Kibaki.[19] At the time of his death, he was the Minister for Environment and Mineral Resources. As the former Minister of Roads and Public Works, he was notable for the implementation of speed governors on matatus (public buses) and for the enforcement of passenger capacity limits.[20] For this, he won the Kenya National Commission's

[16] I cannot say much about how aware voters were of politician performance before the report card distribution, since I only have post-intervention measures of performance.

[17] Kenya's Environment Minister John Michuki dead at 80: http://www.nation.co.ke/News/Kenyas+Environment+Minister+John+Michuki+dead+at+80/-/1056/1332518/-/oddu7l/-/

[18] Life and Times of John Michuki: http://www.kassfm.co.ke/news/2218-life-and-times-of-the-late-john-michuki

[19] Michuki studied Economics, Finance and Public Administration at Oxford's Worcester College. Kenya: The Life and Times of John Michuki: http://allafrica.com/stories/201202241372.html

[20] Michuki Holds Crisis Talks On 'Matatu' Laws: http://allafrica.com/stories/200402040136.html

Human Rights 'Waziri' Award in 2006.[21] As the Minister of Internal Security, he was infamous for his 'shoot to kill' order to police, in confrontations with illicit Mungiki gangs.[22] Michuki was also known for his infamous quote in response to criticism of the state's police raids of a local newspaper: "If you rattle a snake, you must be prepared to be bitten by it."[23]

This study holds constituency level factors constant, in order to better understand how people responded to the content of the information provided. However, it is important to keep in mind the context of the constituency from which the sample was drawn. Access to newspapers in towns is possible but not convenient. A substantial portion of respondents obtain information from radio and regularly listen to shows that discuss politics. Almost all of the respondents are voters but do not identify with a particular party. Self-reported voting rates are particularly high, at over 90%, when compared with the average of approximately 65% across Kenya in the 2007 elections (The Commonwealth Observer Group 2007). Voters are almost all co-ethnics and generally better off than other constituencies around Kenya. The MP was well-regarded and prominent in national politics for notable feats of making public transport safer and for cracking down on illicit gangs.

3.4 Experimental Design

There were two interventions. For both interventions, a copy of the materials was left with a randomly selected subset of households within each village. Treatment was randomly assigned at the village and individual level. Three villages received the first intervention, three villages received the second intervention, and three villages served as the comparison. Within treatment villages, respondents were randomly assigned to treatment. In the control villages, a random sample of respondents was interviewed to serve as a comparison. The experimental design is imperfect. Randomizing at the village and individual level limits the power of the analysis, and is something that will be further addressed in the model specifications.

[21] http://www.knchr.org/dmdocuments/PastHumanRightsAwardees.pdf

[22] Bloody gang violence raises alarm in Kenya: http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/06/08/us-kenya-mungiki-idUSL0872815820070608

[23] Raided Kenya paper back on street: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/4769556.stm

3.5 Data Collection

The materials distribution took place over the course of a week. The distributors were instructed to be as unobtrusive as possible, so that we could better understand the effect of the materials. In many cases, people were not home during the day, and the pamphlet was left in the front door of the homestead. Approximately 3-4 weeks after the initial distribution, a team of enumerators proficient in English, Kiswahili, and Kikuyu went and interviewed both treated and non-treated households across all the villages.[24] The interviewers were not the same individuals who had distributed the material. The project was introduced as an academic study. Neither the NTA nor the report card were mentioned in the introduction. The survey had a battery of questions regarding civic engagement, political knowledge, and political activism. Additional open-ended qualitative interviews were conducted in a separate random sample of 66 households across all villages.

There is no baseline survey for these respondents. Across all villages, we can compare the treated with the non-treated in the full sample. Within treatment villages, we can subset the data to compare those assigned to treatment with those not assigned to treatment. An alternative specification compares those directly assigned to treatment with those in the "pure control" village.[25] This yields similar results to comparing across all villages in the full sample.

The survey captures political behavior in the past month in order to capture the time period since the information was distributed.[26] Thus, we have approximately 15 interviews with treated households and 15 interviews with potentially indirectly treated households for each of the 6 treated villages. For control villages, 30 randomly selected individuals serve as a comparison.[27]

[24] The households were randomly sampled from a list of all households within the village, using a random number generator. The survey instruments were in English, but during training, we standardized the translation of the questions to Kikuyu amongst all 10 enumerators.

[25] See Online Appendix at: `http://stanford.edu/~kwzhang/fieldpaper_appendix.pdf`

[26] It is unlikely that we initially raised expectations that we would return to ask about behavior, as at the time of the distribution of materials, I was not even certain I would be returning for a follow-up.

[27] For all villages, respondents were randomly sampled from village household lists.

4 Expected Outcomes

4.1 CDF Report Card

The information materials provide details about politician management of local CDF funds, which are highly visible within the locality.[28] Thus, I would expect for awareness of the CDF to increase, in terms of *political knowledge*. Political knowledge outcomes include knowing about the CDF, mentioning the report card during discussion of the CDF, and knowing what the report card is. Moreover, the materials detail leakages in government spending. It can impact *political attitudes* by updating an individual's evaluative judgments of government performance. Sen (1999, 56) highlights the role of both included and excluded information in making an evaluative judgment–excluded information is implicitly not permitted to have any direct influence. Measures of political attitudes include respondents' judgments about how the CDF affects their community, perceptions of government leakage, whether or not they view government/politics as a constraint to development, willingness to ask the MP about the CDF, and willingness to vote.

The materials distributed did not specifically highlight the unaccounted for money as corruption–the audit presented projects with unaccounted for money and projects with fully accounted for money. However, finding out about unaccounted for money can increase dissatisfaction with government performance and increase an individual's willingness to scrutinize the politician's actions. New information can potentially increase the likelihood that individuals will want to monitor these projects. Thus, I also expect the information campaign to impact *political behavior*. Increased deliberative discussions and engagement with community issues can occur, as information can encourage citizens to exercise their political freedoms and civil liberties (Sen 1999, 151-6). Outcomes of interest for political behavior are discussing development, attending village meetings or a chief's baraza, contacting a politician or government official, and following up on a CDF project.

4.2 CDF Report Card and Public Participation Flyer

The flyer highlights processes that citizens themselves may become involved in and what officials are responsible for project implementation. Potentially, in detailing these processes and

[28] The full copy of the report card is available in the Online Appendix.

the actors involved, the flyer can allow citizens to identify alternative ways of participation that avoid any pre-existing social or political constraints that they face. It does not tell individuals to take specific actions with regard to CDF projects. Rather, it is suggestive in detailing the legislation, decision-making processes, and political rights that individuals have to participate in CDF projects. Measures political knowledge from this intervention are the count of correct answers to a quiz and knowing about the Bill of Rights. The expectation here is also that attitudinal and behavioral changes are more likely through this intervention.

Paluck and Green (2009) point out how modest interventions that legitimize expressions of dissent can increase citizens' repertoire of available actions, and enable individuals to challenge norms of deference in their study of the impacts of a radio program in Rwanda. However, while their study primarily focuses on social and cultural legitimization, I posit that information about public participation can potentially enable people to figure out ways to take action, in spite of sociopolitical constraints.

4.3 Potential Alternatives

The literature suggests that reducing information asymmetries about politician performance does not always increase citizen demand for accountability. If there is a low quality pool of politicians or an institutional context that systematically excludes citizen participation, then information about leakages in politician spending could potentially disempower citizens. Citizens may choose to take no action because of alienation from the political system and a perceived lack of political efficacy. This is measured by looking at individual perceptions of influence over national politics.

Or perhaps, they might rather have private transfers than public transfers from their politician. One politician's promise is only as good as his/her ability to deliver on the promise. A politician's ability to deliver may be constrained in an environment riddled by corruption in the bureaucracy and in other political leaders. Information about ineffective or poorly implemented development projects could reduce the credibility of public goods provision, and increase the likelihood that citizens prefer to ask for private transfers rather than public transfers from their MP. Thus, we can also examine if citizens are more likely to ask for private transfers as an outcome.

5 The Impact of Information on Citizens

For intuition, the simplest linear probability model is presented. To account for treatment assignment at the village-individual level, I use block bootstrap standard errors, and multiple statistical specifications to check for robustness. The findings presented hold when the data is collapsed to the village-treatment level, and both probit and logit (with and without fixed effects) models yield similar results.

For the average treatment effect in the **Full Sample**, on individuals directly assigned to Treatment 1 (T1) or Treatment 2 (T2), a linear probability model is estimated:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_o + \beta_1 T1_{ij} + \beta_2 T2_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} \tag{1}$$

For the average treatment effect **Within Villages**, on individuals directly assigned to Treatment 1 (T1) and Treatment 2 (T2), a linear probability model is estimated that compares treated individuals to non-treated individuals within their own village:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_o + \beta_1 T1_{ij} + \beta_2 T2_{ij} + v_j + \epsilon_{ij} \tag{2}$$

In these models, Y_{ij} is the outcome of individual i assigned to treatment in village j, with block bootstrap error term ϵ_{ij} and village fixed effect v_j. Note that Model 2 drops the control villages, which do not have any treated individuals. To the extent that there are potential spillover effects within villages, this model would bias my estimates downwards. Thus, this specification yields a more conservative estimate of potential treatment effects.

An alternative specification compares those assigned to treatment with the pure control villages, dropping those that may potentially be indirectly affected within villages. This does not change the main results either, and its findings are similar to that of the full sample specification.[29]

A note on vocabulary. Those assigned to treatment are directly treated. Those within a treated village who were not assigned to treatment, are potentially indirectly treated from being in a treated village, and thus not pure controls. These groups are outlined in Table 1b. Summary statistics indicate that the sample is balanced for almost all 24 household variables

[29] For results of the alternative specifications, see the Online Appendix.

from joint F-tests, except for ownership of a business or shop and the age of the respondent. This is perhaps not surprising, given the number of observables being checked for balance.[30] The results do not change when these variables are included as controls in the specifications.

Materials were delivered to households, not to specific individuals, and were left in the front door if no one was there. This implies an underestimate of the impact of the interventions, since the respondent was interviewed as a representative of the household and was not necessarily a direct recipient of the materials.

First, the impact of information on the intermediate outcome of political knowledge is presented. Then outcomes of political behavior and attitudes are discussed, before accounting for alternative explanations. Further analysis then investigates how the outcomes can vary with interactions between treatment and a respondent's pre-existing characteristics.

5.1 Did Information Increase Citizen Knowledge?

Political Knowledge: Individual Outcomes

Table 2a illustrates that the treated were more aware of the report card. Respondents are more likely to mention the report card of their own volition when asked about the CDF, and to know about the report card when asked directly. The remaining indicators for political knowledge do not appear significant across different specifications.

Around 84% of the respondents in the control group already knew about the CDF, perhaps indicating that the added value of the materials in raising awareness of the CDF was minimal. Contrary to expectation, Intervention 2 has no impact on an individual's knowledge of decision-making processes and legal rights, as measured through Count Correct Answers. That the mean of the score in the control group is low at 1.24 (out of 7 correct answers) indicates that it may not be an appropriate measure of knowledge. The report card and flyer do not appear to significantly increase the likelihood that an individual knows about the Bill of Rights, counter to expectations. This lack of information uptake may indicate either difficulties in comprehension or lack of interest, aspects that will be further explored when looking at interaction terms in

[30] The imbalance of business or shop is because two villages assigned to Treatment 1 had almost zero businesses or shops. The lack of business and shops in these villages would likely lead me to underestimate the impact of the report cards, since the comparison villages have higher levels of entrepreneurial activity. The average age of respondent appears to be higher for Treatment 2. This would also likely bias against me, since older age is associated with stronger resistance to information uptake (Zaller 1992).

Section 5.5. Whether or not the respondent knew about devolution of 15% of national monies to the county level is a measure of more general political knowledge not covered in the information campaign. The treatment does not improve this outcome across multiple specifications.

The information campaign appears to have no distinguishable spillover effects, except for knowing about devolution and the count of correct answers.[31] The indirect effect of the report and flyer intervention is in the opposite direction from what was expected and is significant across different specifications. It is not clear why having neighbors who receive the materials might reduce an individual's knowledge about devolution or count of correct answers.

Political Knowledge: Mean Effects

When the multiple outcomes of political knowledge are standardized to one outcome variable, the information campaign has a positive but insignificant impact on overall political knowledge for both interventions in Table 2b. The analysis of mean effect size is based upon Kling et al. (2007). The outcome variables are standardized with mean equal to zero and standard deviation equal to 1, and a new dependent variable is created that is the average of these outcomes. Noticeably, the comparison group mean is negative and indicates very low baseline levels of political knowledge.

Looking at this family of outcomes raises concerns about a multiple-inference problem, as looking at multiple outcomes also increases the likelihood that one the outcomes will be statistically significant by random chance. However, the main results of knowing or mentioning the CDF report card still hold with multiplicity adjustments to the p values. Table 2c shows the adjusted p values for outcomes in political knowledge, using the Westfall and Young (1993) free step-down resampling method detailed in Anderson (2008). When controlling for Familywise Error Rate Control (FWER) through this method, all rejections of the null will be correct with a high probability.

Political Knowledge: Discussion

A closer examination of the data reveals imperfect compliance, as approximately half of those assigned to treatment do not report knowing about the CDF report card. The content

[31] Results not shown, in Appendix

in its original form was technical, as the report card's typical target audience was urban.[32] Table 1a shows that around 5% of respondents assigned to receive the information materials reported not reading it. In a separate set of open-ended interviews, some respondents cited lack of time for reading through all of the materials, as daylight hours are spent on the farm or doing household chores.[33] Some indicated that they did not use the materials at all, some barely recalled receiving them, and some appeared to find the materials too technical (including a local school teacher).[34]

HHID 113 flat out said about the report card only treatment: "She wasn't able to know what they were talking about." However, others appeared to have no issues, with HHID 504 who received both materials saying: "Yes, it helps us in so many ways of knowing number of projects, money used, transparency."

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how respondents knew about the CDF report card, and whether or not they shared it with others. Of the 71 respondents who reported knowing about the CDF report card: 40 (56%) reported being a direct recipient. Some spillover of information to the non-treated occurred, with 19 respondents (26%) reporting that they had heard about the report card from someone else in the village. Seven people mentioned hearing about it on the radio (10%).[35] Of the the sample that knew about the CDF report card, about 15% shared with someone within the village, 18% with others in the household, and 10% with a neighbor. Only 3% reported sharing the materials with someone outside of the village. This is to some extent captured in the control group: 8 individuals reported hearing about the CDF report card from someone outside the village.

In short, the information campaign appeared to increase awareness of the report card, but not necessarily about the content. Individuals were not more likely to know about the CDF or the Bill of Rights, although this information was shared amongst the community.

[32]Estimating total effect on treated may not be ideal, as I do not have reliable measure of an individual being "treated", since the intervention targeted households rather than individuals. Estimating the effect of the treatment on the treated may not be relevant anyways, as any organization distributing similar materials cannot force people to read it.

[33]For instance, HHID 309 stated "Hasn't been able to read it because of time." Others indicated that they had not yet finished the materials, with HHID 914 indicating that for the report card and flyer: "When she finishes book, she would want to share the information with other villagers, as well as village leaders." Translations by Kikuyu interviewer.

[34]For instance, HHID 316 said: "He doesn't really remember the report card but says he read some of it and hasn't used it yet."

[35]It is unclear what information they heard on the radio, as the NTA did not launch the report card publicly in Kangema.

5.2 Information Dissemination and Political Behavior

It is unclear the degree to which respondents understood and absorbed the technical information, which calls for some caution in interpreting the behaviors resulting from the information campaign.

Political Behavior: Individual Outcomes

Table 3a shows how the information campaign appears to have no statistically distinguishable impact on whether or not a respondent discussed development, the likelihood of attending a village meeting or attending a chief's baraza (meetings that are held weekly by the local chief with elders, subchiefs, and villagers), or contacting a government official or politician in the past month. However, the information campaign appears to have increased the likelihood that an individual will follow-up on a CDF project in the past month.

For the report card and flyer recipients, the effect is large at approximately 0.220, compared to the mean of the control group at 0.112 (that about 11% of people follow-up otherwise), across the entire sample. This is robust across different specifications. For the report card only recipients, the coefficients are positive but not robust to the within-village specification.

The within village estimate and the FWER adjusted p values indicate that receiving both the report card and flyer is necessary for an individual to take action. However, when testing if the coefficients for Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 are equal to each other, we cannot reject the null that they are the same. This may be due to the lack of power, as the full sample p value approaches significance at 0.113. There patterns are in line with the expectation that information in the report card can empower people to take action when coupled with additional information about public participation. However, it appears that rather than using the information as a tool for action, the flyer potentially served as a cue that prompted engagement with local projects.

Political Behavior: Mean Effects

Analysis of the mean effect indicates that the impact of the interventions on political behavior is positive but statistically insignificant, as shown in Table 3b. Although the intervention has no identifiable impact on the summary index of outcomes, we are still interested in seeing

if the interventions had a statistically significant impact on each outcome when accounting for multiplicity. Table 3c presents the adjusted p values for outcomes in political behavior, again using FWER adjusted p values from Anderson (2008). The treatment of the report card and flyer appears to remain significant in prompting citizens to monitor local CDF projects. However, the main effect of the report card only treatment becomes indistinguishable from zero, as the p value is adjusted upward.

Political Behavior: Discussion

Information can serve as a useful tool for citizens to take action, or as a cue that prompts them to action. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as the campaign could both inform and inspire curiosity. However, the empirical evidence presented here on political knowledge suggests that the information acted more as a cognitive cue than as a technology that citizens could directly use. This relates to findings by Banerjee et al. (2010) in India, which finds that just telling voters not to vote along caste lines, reduces the probability that voters would choose a candidate from their own caste from 25% to 18%.

The coefficients for contacting a government official or politician are statistically insignificant, but negative. The negative coefficients may indicate that very real social or political barriers exist for citizens in contacting their public officials about their concerns. In the open-ended interviews, when asked about whether or not someone would likely be punished for reporting corruption, responses were mixed.[36]

Since citizens appear *less* likely to contact a politician or government official, but still more willing to follow-up on a CDF project, it is likely that it is not formal legal rights that enables citizens to act. Rather, the combination of the report card with the flyer may have stimulated the imagination of individuals and increased the set of available actions that individuals can potentially take. Information can raise awareness and create new opportunities for citizens to actively engage in the issues that they care about. In a pioneering study in Bangalore, Paul (1998, 13) details how distributed report cards provided a handy tool for citizens to focus on issues of concern and stimulated them to think about remedial actions: "Perhaps the most important outcome was the public awareness created by the report card on the need for active

[36]Responses ranged from: "That no longer happens, people are free to talk" (HHID 101) to "If the info lacks basis, this person can be arrested" (HHID 812).

citizen participation in order to improve the quality of civic services". Citizens do appear to be willing to take action, but outside of formal channels.[37] For example, respondent HHID 213 reports the information as being useful:

> Thank you, getting information that has been elusive for some time. Good to get educated. Useful because helps community. Have some power to follow-up on CDF project–be going to projects to see what they are doing.

From the separated open-ended interviews that we conducted, respondents described CDF follow-up as visiting local projects, meeting with local project management committee members, speaking with the village elder, and contacting the local CDF fund manager or NTA representative.[38]

Citizens may prefer to turn to informal means to achieve outcomes when faced with binding political or social constraints. Keefer and Khemani (2011) find that information about education increases parents' private investment in their child's education rather through governmental accountability channels. Banerjee et al. (2010) similarly find that report cards about educational outcomes have no impact on formal participation in school committees/decision-making, possibly because of social constraints, but do have an impact in increasing participation in informal reading groups.

Political Behavior: A Caveat

The measures of political behavior here are self-reports. While local officials have verified that individuals have contacted them, I do not have data on the entire sample. There are two potential problems that can come from self-reports: over-reporting and social desirability bias. While the means of the control groups do not appear to be skewed towards to top of the distribution, and exhibit considerable variance, it is a possibility that respondents are not telling the truth. Over-reporting might be especially problematic if there was reason to believe that it systematically varied between treatment and control. Social desirability or experimenter demand might induce treated individuals to say what they think interviewers want to hear.

[37] However, some individuals did still go through formal channels even without the additional flyer, as respondent HHID 111 indicates that the report card: "Helps her because she is more keen, and goes to the chief's more often."

[38] In the follow-up, the NTA representative verified that 3-4 individuals had contacted him. The contact information, with their permission, was added as a supplemental back page in our materials distribution.

However, I do not believe that this is a major issue here for two reasons. First, because interviewers were not affiliated with the NTA, and many of these questions were asked as a part of a large battery of questions about information access, political affiliation, political participation, community participation, etc. Second, because some of the questions where you might expect bias to be the highest since it was covered in the materials–such as knowing about the CDF or discussing development–have no statistically distinguishable effect between treatment and control groups.

5.3 Information Dissemination and Political Attitudes

Two dimensions of political attitudes are examined, attitudes towards government effectiveness and attitudes towards electoral accountability. The former relates to the literature on public service delivery and perceptions of institutional capacity. The latter relates to the political dimension of the CDF in directly linking the incumbent politician to the information about constituency spending. Neither are robust to different specifications, which may be due to the limited sample size.[39]

Political Attitudes Towards Government Effectiveness

The information provided was expected to update an individual's evaluative judgment of government performance. Table 4 presents the results for political attitudes. Although statistically insignificant, individuals appear to be more pessimistic about how much the CDF has helped the community after receiving the information, which is consistent with an unaccounted-for monies interpretation of the report card. However, recipients of the materials also appear to perceive less corruption and to be less likely to cite government/politics as a constraint to development. This pattern is counter to the expectation of dissatisfaction with leakages in politician spending.

During separate open-ended interviews, respondents mentioned that they had not known that their MP had done so many projects. The materials were not explicitly framed as corruption, allowing the interpretation of the booklet to go in either direction.[40] The report card

[39]For example, power calculations indicate that for the sample may be too underpowered to detect an effect for perceptions of corruption. To detect a statistically significant effect size of 10% from the control group mean of 81%, I would need at least 158 individuals per treatment arm.

[40]The content was two-sided information flow (Zaller 1992).

highlighted projects where no money was unaccounted for and projects where money was unaccounted for (see Appendix for sample pages from report card). For example, respondent HHID 509 stated for the report and flyer:

> Did read it, useful because buildings he saw on there. Knew money around is not lost, where it goes. Useful because looking at it good, read and understood what is going on.

Fiorina and Noll (1979) suggest that for legislative pork to the constituency, voters will always prefer something to nothing–regardless of legislator performance in national policymaking. Although respondents appear to be less optimistic about CDF projects, the information may have improved their overall outlook as to local spending, because they did not previously know about the scope and range of projects being funded by government beforehand. For instance, HHID 508 states that the report card is:

> "Useful because reminder of what has been done in development everytime she sees it."

Such an interpretation suggests that individuals may be surprised to find that any money reaches them at all. This would be consistent with the mean of the control group, which reports expected government leakage to be 81%. The report card indicates actual leakage to be 17%-21%, which is actually much lower than the perceived expectations of leakage.[41] Thus, respondents do appear to update their beliefs in the correct direction overall, with perceived corruption reducing by 10% from the baseline expectations. This effect is statistically distinguishable, although only for the full sample, and not for the within village comparison.[42] The effect may disappear from the within village specification because of lack of power from the reduced sample size.

[41] Thanks to Kate Casey for pointing out this insight to me.

[42] At the individual level, it is hard to say exactly how individuals update their perceptions of corruption. It may be the case that citizens already satisfied with government performance under their highly performing MP used the information to confirm their beliefs. Some evidence that suggests that individuals will only uptake information the confirms their prior beliefs (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000). Zaller (1992) also suggests that individuals with stronger predispositions or larger stores of information may be less susceptible to changes in attitude. Zaller's two-sided information model would also expect for the most politically attuned to pick up either message in line with his or her pre-existing beliefs. Olken (2009) presents evidence from Indonesia as to how individual and village level characteristics can systematically bias perceptions of corruption. While I would not expect for any of these differences to be systematic between treatment and control groups, there are potential heterogenous treatment effects that I cannot account for in the absence of baseline data.

Perhaps rather than wanting to "throw out the bums", the pervasiveness of corruption makes corruption less of a pure valence issue amongst citizens. It is in contrast to what might be expected in other contexts with stronger institutions for checking corruption, such as in American politics (Fiorina 1981). Although there is a large amount of money unaccounted for, the majority of the monies (on 39/48 projects) were classified as being spent well within the constituency. Thus, an alternative interpretation could be that the direction of the information provided was actually in favor of the government performance. Rather than becoming strictly dissatisfied with government, along some dimensions, citizens appear on average to become more approving.

Political Attitudes Towards Electoral Accountability

Electoral accountability implies components of monitoring and rewarding/sanctioning politician performance. The effects are weakly significant and not robust across different specifications. On the monitoring side, the report card appears to increase the likelihood that citizens will ask their MP about the CDF. The coefficient is large (coef. 0.069 and s.e. 0.035) in comparison to the mean of the control group (0.011). The question was an open-ended one, that simply asked what a respondent would want to ask their MP if he was to come to their community today (see Appendix for coding). On the rewarding/sanctioning side, Treatment 2 appears to marginally increase willingness to vote in the next national election. However, that over 90% of respondents in the control group reported that they intended to vote in the next election makes any marginal effect of the information campaign potentially difficult to detect, and indicates possible over-reporting.

5.4 Potential Alternative Explanations

The information campaign appears to have no impact on political efficacy or willingness to ask for private goods in Table 5. Although the significant effect is not robust to different specifications, the report card and flyer appear to reduce perceptions of influence over national government. This is counter to the intuition that the flyer was intended to empower individuals with information about how to participate and demand better governance. But these results may be complementary to finding that citizens prefer informal means of accountability when

faced with unresponsive formal institutions.

Although some evidence suggests that information can displace vote-buying, private transfers can take the place of public transfers and become the norm of transaction in these contexts (Finan and Schechter 2012; Banerjee et al. 2011; León 2012; Wantchekon 2009). North et al. (2009) note how the organization of many developing countries tends to be based upon limited access to political and economic resources, and are typically characterized by patron-client networks that distribute these resources through personalized relations.

Awareness of spending leakages may erode the credibility of the politician to provide public goods, and increase expectations of a private transfer. Approximately 10% of the sample would ask their MP for private goods.[43]

5.5 Interaction Effects

5.5.1 How Knowledge Varies with Comprehension and Interest

The main findings in Table 6 on political knowledge suggest that a respondent's ability to read English, level of education, and degree of political interest may vary with information uptake of the report card and flyer. Reading English and completing secondary school can indicate a respondent's ability to comprehend the material. Considering that approximately 43% of the sample knew English (mean of 0.431 and standard deviation of 0.496) and 26% had completed secondary school (mean of 0.262 and standard deviation of 0.440), comprehension varied across individuals. Listening to political radio shows can serve as proxy for political interest. Potentially the habit of consuming political news shows could also indicate some degree of political sophistication.

Table 6a illustrates that knowing the correct answers to the quiz is endogenous to knowing English, completing secondary school, and listening to political radio shows. This would be consistent with evidence from the American politics literature that education can be associated with being more politically sophisticated and aware (Converse 1964). Knowing English is also associated with knowing about the Constituency Development Fund and about the Bill of Rights.

[43]This same responses for coded for asks about CDF, see Appendix. The question was an open-ended one, that simply asked what a respondent would want to ask their MP if he was to come to their community today.

5.5.2 How Behavior Varies with Political Activity and Connections

For political behavior, we can examine if the likelihood of following-up on a CDF project varies with initial political activeness on the part of the respondent, as proxied by being a village elder. Also, to the extent that social and political constraints might matter, we can look at how formal (contacting a government official or politician) and informal (following up on a CDF project) pathways to action might vary with having social connections to political leaders. These relationships of shared interests and moral obligations can facilitate informal demands for accountability (Tsai 2007).

In Table 7, village elders (or former village elders) who receive the report card are significantly less likely to contact a government official. The large negative coefficient for the interaction term (coef. -0.447 and s.e. 0.221), compared with the main effect of being a village elder (coef. 0.325 and s.e. 0.224) is rather puzzling, considering that they are the direct representatives of the central government; we might have expected for them to be the most likely to use the information. Elders receiving a report card are also less likely to contact a politician or follow-up on a CDF project, although these terms are not significant. Concerns of being associated with leakages in spending, not wanting to raise issues of corruption, or perceptions of institutional hierarchy are potential explanations. The possibility that the village elite might be adverse to increased transparency in local spending, would be consistent with the Olken (2007) findings in Indonesia.

Respondents are approximately 20% more likely to contact a politician upon receiving the report card and flyer, if they live in the same household as a public leader (coef. 0.205, s.e. 0.059) or if they are friends with a public leader (coef. 0.176, s.e. 0.069). This is large in magnitude to the main effects of living with a public leader, being friends with a public leader, and treatments, which are not statistically distinguishable from zero. Moreover, we can confidently reject the hypothesis that the interaction terms for Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 are equal to each other. Thus, Treatment 2 is distinguishable from Treatment 1 for this interaction effect.

In following-up on CDF projects, only the main effects of treatment are statistically significant for those who live with a public leader and for being a village elder. Individuals who are friends with a public leader are significantly more likely to follow-up on local development projects in response to the second intervention. The interaction term for Treatment 2 is large

relative (coef. 0.364, s.e. 0.091) to the main effects of being friends with a public leader (coef. -0.021 s.e. 0.053), Treatment 2 (coef. 0.111, s.e. 0.034), and the control average (0.202). These findings are robust to different specifications. Having a friend as a public leader and receiving the report card only for Treatment 1 has a positive but statistically indistinguishable effect (coef. 0.120, s.e. 0.077). We can reject the hypothesis that the two treatment interaction terms are equal.

That this does not hold for households that have a public leader and village elders themselves indicates that it is likely social connections that matter for monitoring local public goods. For elders and households with a public leader, this information may not be new news or welcome news. However, for the average individual, social connections with a public official may help to relax costs to taking action.

5.5.3 How Attitudes Vary with Comprehension

For political attitudes, Table 8 presents how perceptions of government efficacy and electoral accountability might vary with a respondent's ability to comprehend the report card. The interaction terms for political attitudes are not robust for the full sample and within sample specifications.

6 Conclusion

Both Putnam (1993) and Besley (2006) highlight the important link between civic virtue and government: Societies with greater civic virtue will have more responsive governments and a higher quality political class. How can information play a role in stimulating citizens to become more active and engaged in monitoring politician performance?

While those who received the information treatment were more aware of materials, information uptake was very low. There appeared to be no distinguishable impact on political attitudes across specifications, possibly because of the sample size or because the effects were attenuated by the two-sided (neutral) presentation of information. However, there is suggestive evidence that the report card, when coupled with information about public participation, can prompt citizens to actively monitor these constituency development projects. This information may be especially useful for those who have social access to local leaders.

That the actions taken were generally outside of formal processes, speaks to the very real social and political constraints that villagers may face in demanding a responsiveness government. Rather, these individuals turned to alternative means–speaking with a local CDF committee member, contacting the National Taxpayer's Association for further information, visiting a local project–to address their concerns. Access to a public leader appears to be highly important in the village context, in enabling an individual to engage in monitoring behavior. This is consistent with Tsai (2007), who finds that personalized relations with public officials may be an important means of informal accountability. While this study provides no evidence of social networks, it does offer insights as to how social links can potentially be utilized to strengthen accountability, rather than undermine it.

This paper has presented evidence that information about politician performance may need coupled with information about public participation to activate citizens' awareness about potential ways to become involved. The pilot project began from a framework that viewed information as a tool for accountability. However, the discussion of the findings suggests that information plays an equally important role in prompting citizens to identify their own ways of taking action on the issues that they care the most about. For the numerous civil society and non-governmental organizations working to promote local citizen engagement, this can be an important policy consideration. However, whether or not this behavior will be sustained over time is an open question. It has been suggested that donor-driven external interventions in villages, such as the intervention described in this study, may have not long-run impacts beyond the project itself (Casey et al. 2011).

It is important to keep in mind the constituency context in which this study took place. At the time of the materials distribution, Kangema Constituency was headed by a highly effective and very prominent MP in Kenyan politics, John Michuki. Michuki was a political insider with President Kibaki and had a reputation for being a ruthless but efficient manager. Respondents appeared surprised at just how much their MP had done through Constituency Development Fund projects, and possibly overestimated the amount of leakage in government spending. Even in having a highly educated and nationally prominent MP with a record of accomplishments, it appears that citizens were largely unaware of their politician's performance in local public goods, and were curious to know more.

Perhaps, lack of information in a low governance equilibrium masks not only poor performance, but also good performance by politicians. This may be one explanation for the low rates of citizen satisfaction with politician performance in Kenya,[44] and the high rates of politician turnover across sub-Saharan Africa more generally (Opalo 2012). High turnover rates and short time horizons are also associated with increased shirking and rent-seeking (Besley and Case 1995; Dal Bó and Rossi 2011; Finan and Ferraz 2011). Thus, low information environments can potentially further sustain poor governance outcomes, in interfering with both the selection and incentive mechanisms of electoral accountability.

Recent reforms have led Kenya, like many other developing democracies, to devolve authority and funding to the county level. This devolution of authority by the new Constitution makes the context of this study especially relevant, as political power and state resources are now being decentralized to the county level. New governors are to be elected in each county, with 15% of national government revenue at their budgetary disposal. Thus, understanding how information campaigns about politicians can lead to increased scrutiny and citizen rewarding/sanctioning of politicians in both election and non-election years is of central importance.

[44]The Star (Nairobi), 2 July 2011. "Kenya: Most MPs Would Lose Seats in Election - Poll": "If Kenya was to go to polls today, 63 per cent of MPs would be sent home. This is according to a survey released yesterday by the Infotrak research company. The findings indicate that majority of Kenyans are unhappy with the MPs' inability to honour the promises they made prior to elections and the misuse of CDF."

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Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Household/Respondent Characteristics					
Average monthly income	275	2187.636	2727.782	0	20000
Owns business or shop	275	0.142	0.349	0	1
Put off medical treatment due to costs in the past year	273	0.242	0.429	0	1
Has electricity	275	0.222	0.416	0	1
Household size	275	3.731	2.158	0	10
Someone has moved out of household in past 5 years	275	0.433	0.496	0	1
Male	272	0.390	0.489	0	1
Age	271	49.661	16.916	18	96
Could read English	274	0.431	0.496	0	1
Knew someone who could read English	275	0.960	0.196	0	1
Completed secondary school	275	0.262	0.440	0	1
Owns mobile phone	275	0.793	0.406	0	1
Owns radio	275	0.916	0.277	0	1
Owns TV	275	0.287	0.453	0	1
Walks to town	273	0.645	0.479	0	1
Voted in past election	275	0.927	0.260	0	1
Member of political party	275	0.215	0.411	0	1
Reads newspaper	275	0.433	0.496	0	1
Listen to radio shows that discuss politics	275	0.855	0.353	0	1
Frequency of church attendance	274	2.642	0.947	0	4
Political Knowledge					
Knows CDF	275	0.840	0.367	0	1
Count of correct answers on quiz	274	1.124	1.092	0	4
Knows about legal rights to political participation	275	0.444	0.498	0	1
Knows about devolution of 15% to the county level	272	0.232	0.423	0	1
Mentioned CDF report card	275	0.029	0.168	0	1
Knows about the CDF report card	273	0.260	0.439	0	1
Did not read CDF report card	275	0.051	0.220	0	1
Political Attitudes					
Would ask MP about the CDF	275	0.033	0.178	0	1
Will vote in next national election	271	0.974	0.159	0	1
Degree to which the CDF has helped community	261	2.130	1.467	0	5
Perceived percentage of corruption	263	77.144	31.666	0	100
Development constraint is government/politics	274	0.212	0.409	0	1
Political Behavior					
Discussed development in past month	275	0.680	0.467	0	1
Attended village meeting in past month	275	0.415	0.494	0	1
Attended chief's baraza in past month	275	0.302	0.460	0	1
Contacted government official in past month	275	0.142	0.349	0	1
Contacted politician in past month	275	0.073	0.260	0	1
Followed-up on a CDF project in past month	272	0.202	0.402	0	1
Alternatives					
Degree of influence in national government decisions	256	2.445	1.157	1	4
Would ask MP for private goods	275	0.102	0.303	0	1
Political Connections					
Has been village elder	275	0.076	0.266	0	1
Public leader lives in household	275	0.167	0.374	0	1
Public leader as a friend	275	0.305	0.461	0	1

Table 1b: Summary Statistics by Group

	Direct Report Card	Direct Report Card and Flyer	Indirect Report Card	Indirect Report Card and Flyer	Control	F-Statistic	N
Income	2765.909	2186	2012.245	1820.93	2176.405	0.402	275
	(4064.320)	(2336.643)	(1784.147)	(2129.449)	(2811.665)		
Owns business or shop	0.023	0.16	0.061	0.186	0.213	0.076*	275
	(0.151)	(0.370)	(0.242)	(0.394)	(0.412)		
Had to put off medical costs	0.273	0.24	0.224	0.302	0.207	0.828	273
	(0.451)	(0.431)	(0.422)	(0.465)	(0.407)		
Has electricity	0.159	0.3	0.184	0.326	0.18	0.143	275
	(0.370)	(0.463)	(0.391)	(0.474)	(0.386)		
Household size	3.455	4.14	3.429	3.767	3.787	0.328	275
	(1.873)	(2.286)	(1.882)	(2.399)	(2.238)		
Household member has moved	0.409	0.520	0.347	0.349	0.483	0.273	275
	(0.424)	(0.388)	(0.354)	(0.441)	(0.420)		
Respondent is male	0.372	0.367	0.49	0.395	0.352	0.581	272
	(0.489)	(0.487)	(0.505)	(0.495)	(0.480)		
Age of Respondent	47.256	53.857	47.857	54.512	47.103	0.068*	271
	(15.665)	(19.726)	(18.350)	(14.854)	(15.247)		
Respondent can read English	0.386	0.54	0.429	0.405	0.404	0.43	274
	(0.493)	(0.503)	(0.500)	(0.497)	(0.494)		
Knows someone who reads English	0.977	0.98	0.918	0.953	0.966	0.385	275
	(0.151)	(0.141)	(0.277)	(0.213)	(0.181)		
Completed secondary school	0.205	0.34	0.224	0.186	0.303	0.313	275
	(0.408)	(0.479)	(0.422)	(0.394)	(0.462)		
Owns mobile phone	0.773	0.820	0.857	0.744	0.775	0.555	275
	(0.424)	(0.388)	(0.354)	(0.441)	(0.420)		
Owns radio	0.864	0.940	0.898	0.930	0.933	0.549	275
	(0.347)	(0.240)	(0.306)	(0.258)	(0.252)		
Owns TV	0.273	0.280	0.265	0.233	0.337	0.963	275
	(0.451)	(0.454)	(0.446)	(0.427)	(0.475)		
Walks to town	0.659	0.612	0.592	0.698	0.659	0.721	273
	(0.479)	(0.492)	(0.497)	(0.465)	(0.477)		
Voted in past election	0.955	0.920	0.878	0.953	0.933	0.438	275
	(0.211)	(0.274)	(0.331)	(0.213)	(0.252)		
Member of political party	0.227	0.260	0.204	0.186	0.202	0.839	275
	(0.424)	(0.443)	(0.407)	(0.394)	(0.494)		
Reads news	0.523	0.380	0.449	0.442	0.404	0.588	275
	(0.505)	(0.490)	(0.503)	(0.502)	(0.981)		
Listens to political radio shows	0.795	0.840	0.898	0.837	0.876	0.576	275
	(0.408)	(0.370)	(0.306)	(0.374)	(0.331)		
Frequency of religious service	2.614	2.776	2.551	2.651	2.629	0.695	274
	(0.895)	(0.941)	(1.001)	(0.897)	(0.981)		
Has been village elder	0.068	0.140	0.061	0.047	0.067	0.316	275
	(0.255)	(0.351)	(0.242)	(0.213)	(0.252)		
Has been a public leader	0.023	0.060	0.082	0.070	0.045	0.64	275
	(0.151)	(0.240)	(0.277)	(0.258)	(0.208)		
Public leader lives in household	0.159	0.240	0.184	0.163	0.124	0.699	275
	(0.370)	(0.431)	(0.391)	(0.374)	(0.331)		
Public leader as a friend	0.295	0.300	0.327	0.395	0.258	0.726	275
	(0.462)	(0.463)	(0.474)	(0.495)	(0.440)		
Number of villages	3		3		3		
Number of respondents	44	50	49	43	89		

Note: Village averages for each treatment, regressing treatment on household and respondent characteristics. F-test of four equal means. See Appendix for summary statistics collapsed by village.

Table 2a: Political Knowledge

DV:	Knows CDF		Mentions Report Card		Knows Report Card		Count Correct Answers		Knows Bill of Rights		Knows about Devolution	
	Full Sample	Within Village	Full Sample	Within Village	Full Sample	Within Village	Full Sample	Within Village	Full Sample	Within Village	Full Sample	Within Village
T1: Report Card	0.018	0.057	0.103*	0.102**	0.411***	0.345***	-0.144**	-0.147	0.052	0.015	0.137*	0.027
	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.061)	(0.042)	(0.108)	(0.092)	(0.060)	(0.229)	(0.110)	(0.100)	(0.083)	(0.089)
T2: Report Card and Flyer	0.077	-0.036	0.009	-0.007	0.326***	0.300***	0.016	0.061	-0.068	-0.035	-0.012	0.137
	(0.061)	(0.090)	(0.020)	(0.050)	(0.067)	(0.111)	(0.143)	(0.271)	(0.089)	(0.120)	(0.062)	(0.106)
Observations	275	186	275	186	273	184	274	185	275	186	272	183
R-squared	0.006	0.071	0.049	0.070	0.160	0.143	0.003	0.019	0.005	0.110	0.015	0.086
Mean of DV for Control	0.843	0.830	0.000	0.019	0.101	0.163	1.258	1.133	0.438	0.472	0.225	0.221
T1=T2	0.396	0.613	2.283	2.761	0.593	0.097	1.258	0.344	0.565	0.100	2.289	0.628
T1=T2 *p-value*	0.529	0.435	0.131	0.098	0.441	0.756	0.262	0.558	0.452	0.752	0.130	0.429

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, OLS constants not reported. Full Sample Model: OLS with block-bootstrap standard errors. Within Village Model: OLS with village fixed effects, village coefficients not shown.

Table 2b: Mean Effect on Political Knowledge

DV:	Political Knowledge	
	Full Sample	Within Village
T1: Report Card	0.099**	0.066
	(0.042)	(0.078)
T2: Report Card and Flyer	0.070	0.092
	(0.053)	(0.092)
Observations	275	186
R-squared	0.012	0.038
Mean of DV for Control	-0.461	-0.473
T1=T2	0.204	0.048
T1=T2 *p-value*	0.652	0.826

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, OLS constants not reported. Full Sample Model: OLS with block-bootstrap standard errors. Within Village Model: OLS with village fixed effects, village coefficients not shown.

Table 2c: Familywise Error Rate Control (FWER-adjusted p values)

Treatment:	Report Card				Report Card and Flyer			
	Full Sample		Within Village		Full Sample		Within Village	
	p value	*adjusted p value*	*p value*	*adjusted p value*	*p value*	*adjusted p value*	*p value*	*adjusted p value*
Knows CDF	0.016	0.067	0.455	0.892	0.119	0.435	0.695	0.990
Mentions Report Card	0.000	0.000	0.016	0.071	0.644	0.960	0.894	0.990
Knows Report Card	0.050	0.151	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.007	0.039
Count Correct Answers	0.782	0.848	0.521	0.892	0.931	0.974	0.823	0.990
Knows Bill of Rights	0.611	0.848	0.885	0.939	0.836	0.974	0.772	0.990
Knows about Devolution	0.025	0.090	0.759	0.939	0.439	0.889	0.198	0.650

From Anderson (2008), using 10,000 replications.

POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE: Knows CDF: Do you know what the CDF is? **Mentions Report Card:** Enumerator ticked box below Knows CDF question, if respondent mentions report card. **Knows Report Card:** Have you heard of the National Taxpayer's Association's Citizen's CDF Report Card? **Count Correct Answers:** Number of correct answers to (1. Who funds the CDF? 2. What percent of the national government revenue is currently allocated to the CDF? 3. How is the CDF fund allocated to constituencies? 4. Is the CDF fund distribution weighted in favor of urban or rural constituencies? 5. Can CDF funding be used for the purpose of supporting political bodies or activities or for supporting religious bodies or religious activities? 6. At which level are CDF projects selected? 7. What is the minimum number of CDF projects that an MP can have in one year for the constituency?) **Knows Bill of Rights:** Do you know which document guarantees that every citizen has a right of access to information held by the State? **Knows about Devolution:** Did you know that the new Constitution devolves 15% of national government revenue to the county level?

Table 3a: Political Behavior in Past Month

DV:	Discussed development		Attended village meeting		Attended chief's baraza		Contacted government official		Contacted politician		Followed-up on CDF project	
	Full Sample	Within Village	Full Sample	Within Village	Full Sample	Within Village	Full Sample	Within Village	Full Sample	Within Village	Full Sample	Within Village
T1: Report Card	0.037	0.036	0.062	0.050	0.105	0.099	-0.036	-0.072	-0.021	-0.025	0.139***	0.089
	(0.128)	(0.097)	(0.160)	(0.100)	(0.145)	(0.094)	(0.045)	(0.071)	(0.032)	(0.054)	(0.028)	(0.090)
T2: Report Card and Flyer	-0.091	0.001	0.068	-0.059	0.018	0.095	-0.009	0.081	0.054	0.072	0.220***	0.244**
	(0.069)	(0.115)	(0.059)	(0.119)	(0.070)	(0.112)	(0.042)	(0.085)	(0.036)	(0.064)	(0.037)	(0.107)
Observations	275	186	275	186	275	186	275	186	275	186	272	183
R-squared	0.007	0.040	0.004	0.116	0.007	0.074	0.001	0.053	0.008	0.038	0.050	0.060
Mean of DV for Control	0.719	0.698	0.360	0.425	0.281	0.255	0.157	0.151	0.079	0.066	0.112	0.173
T1=T2	0.766	0.055	0.001	0.495	0.301	0.001	0.647	1.915	2.184	1.379	2.505	1.228
T1=T2 *p-value*	0.381	0.815	0.977	0.483	0.583	0.974	0.421	0.168	0.139	0.242	0.113	0.269

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, OLS constants not reported. Full Sample Model: OLS with block-bootstrap standard errors. Within Village Model: OLS with village fixed effects, village coefficients not shown.

Table 3b: Mean Effect on Political Behavior

DV:	Political Behavior	
	Full Sample	Within Village
T1: Report Card	0.047	0.029
	(0.062)	(0.046)
T2: Report Card and Flyer	0.044	0.075
	(0.032)	(0.054)
Observations	275	186
R-squared	0.009	0.075
Mean of DV for Control	-0.387	-0.379
T1=T2	0.001	0.414
T1=T2 *p-value*	0.970	0.521

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, OLS constants not reported. Full Sample Model: OLS with block-bootstrap standard errors. Within Village Model: OLS with village fixed effects, village coefficients not shown.

Table 3c: Familywise Error Rate Control (FWER-adjusted p values)

Treatment:	Report Card				Report Card and Flyer			
	Full Sample		Within Village		Full Sample		Within Village	
	p value	*adjusted p value*	*p value*	*adjusted p value*	*p value*	*adjusted p value*	*p value*	*adjusted p value*
Discussed development	0.793	0.930	0.726	0.958	0.184	0.552	0.509	0.891
Attended village meeting	0.691	0.930	0.738	0.958	0.210	0.552	0.435	0.891
Attended chief's baraza	0.429	0.930	0.110	0.492	0.825	0.968	0.565	0.891
Contacted government official	0.437	0.930	0.545	0.958	0.842	0.968	0.548	0.891
Contacted politician	0.529	0.930	0.655	0.958	0.146	0.537	0.363	0.889
Followed-up on CDF project	0.000	0.000	0.168	0.597	0.000	0.000	0.009	0.049

From Anderson (2008), using 10,000 replications.

POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: Discussed Development: Have you participated in any discussions about development in the past month? **Attended village meeting:** Have you attended any village meetings in the past month? **Attended chief's baraza:** When did you last attend a chief's baraza? **Contacted government official:** Sometimes people will approach government officials when they have an issue with public services. When was the last time that you contacted a public official about public services? **Contacted politician:** Sometimes people will approach politicians when they have an issue with public services. When was the last time that you contacted a politician about public services? **Followed-up on CDF project:** In the past month, have you followed-up on any CDF projects?

Table 4: Political Attitudes

	Attitudes towards government performance						Attitudes towards electoral accountability			
DV:	How much CDF has helped their community		Perceived Corruption (% leakage)		Government/politics is a constraint to development		Would ask MP about CDF		Will vote in next national election	
	Full Sample	Within Village	Full Sample	Within Village	Full Sample	Within Village	Full Sample	Within Village	Full Sample	Within Village
T1: Report Card	-0.166	-0.086	-10.042**	-6.187	-0.040	-0.118	0.069*	0.040	0.011	0.001
	(0.324)	(0.314)	(4.238)	(6.928)	(0.062)	(0.082)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.031)
T2: Report Card and Flyer	-0.191	-0.562	-3.180	-4.023	-0.022	0.019	-0.002	-0.007	0.034**	0.070*
	(0.149)	(0.375)	(5.234)	(8.392)	(0.066)	(0.097)	(0.019)	(0.051)	(0.016)	(0.037)
Observations	261	175	263	179	274	185	275	186	271	183
R-squared	0.003	0.064	0.013	0.067	0.001	0.085	0.020	0.041	0.006	0.030
Mean of DV for Control	2.200	2.248	81.112	78.092	0.225	0.219	0.011	0.028	0.966	0.971
T1=T2	0.005	0.947	0.825	0.040	0.049	1.167	3.236	0.492	1.109	2.029
T1=T2 *p-value*	0.944	0.332	0.364	0.843	0.825	0.281	0.072	0.484	0.292	0.156

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, OLS constants not reported. Full Sample Model: OLS with block-bootstrap standard errors. Within Village Model: OLS with village fixed effects, village coefficients not shown.

Table 5: Alternatives

DV:	Perceptions of influence		Would ask MP for private goods	
	Full Sample	Within Village	Full Sample	Within Village
T1: Report Card	0.249	0.192	-0.020	-0.004
	(0.231)	(0.238)	(0.020)	(0.062)
T2: Report Card and Flyer	-0.362**	-0.087	-0.030	-0.025
	(0.142)	(0.288)	(0.044)	(0.074)
Observations	256	171	275	186
R-squared	0.025	0.136	0.002	0.043
Mean of DV for Control	1.600	1.520	0.101	0.104
T1=T2	4.029	0.560	0.046	0.048
T1=T2 *p-value*	0.045	0.456	0.830	0.827

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, OLS constants not shown. Full Sample Model: OLS with block-bootstrap standard errors. Within Village Model: OLS with village fixed effects, village coefficients not shown.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES: How much CDF has helped their community: How has the CDF affected your village? (A. It is very helpful, with many good projects. B. It is helpful, with some good projects C. It is helpful, but could be improved D. It is only a little helpful E. It is not helpful at all). **Perceived Corruption:** Now I would like you to imagine a hypothetical situation. Imagine that there was a severe drought in Kenya and many people are suffering. Because of this, the central government decides that each Kenyan should receive a relief payment of Ksh. 10,000, which would be distributed by local government officials. How much money do you think each person in this village would receive? **Government/politics is a constraint to development:** What do you think is the biggest constraint the people like you face in attempting to promote development in their communities? **Would ask MP about CDF:** If your MP came to your community today, what would you want to ask him? (See Appendix for coding.) **Will vote in next national election:** Will you vote in the next national election?

ALTERNATIVES: Perceptions of influence: How much influence do you think that someone like you can have over national government decisions that affect your village? A. A lot of influence B. Some influence C. Very little influence D. No influence at all 98 No response 99 Don't know **Would ask MP for private goods:** If your MP came to your community today, what would you want to ask him? (See Appendix for coding.)

Table 6: Political Knowledge Interactions

Dependent Variable	Knows CDF			Count of Correct Answers			Knows about Bill of Rights		
A. Full Sample									
T1: Report Card Only	0.067	0.036	0.169	-0.026	-0.071	0.520	0.108	0.087	-0.126
	(0.104)	(0.067)	(0.157)	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.496)	(0.106)	(0.126)	(0.201)
T2: Report Card and Flyer	0.122*	0.056	0.266*	-0.046	-0.015	-0.216	-0.119	-0.037	-0.348***
	(0.071)	(0.085)	(0.155)	(0.151)	(0.181)	(0.421)	(0.075)	(0.116)	(0.091)
Reads English	0.185***			0.558***			0.272***		
	(0.059)			(0.181)			(0.064)		
Reads English*T1	-0.117			-0.270*			-0.128		
	(0.115)			(0.158)			(0.111)		
Reads English*T2	-0.128*			-0.020			0.029		
	(0.077)			(0.250)			(0.103)		
Secondary School		0.120**			0.624***			0.304***	
		(0.052)			(0.124)			(0.081)	
Secondary School*T1		-0.060			-0.205			-0.094	
		(0.082)			(0.336)			(0.237)	
Secondary School*T2		0.031			-0.064			-0.166	
		(0.087)			(0.123)			(0.205)	
Listens to politics on radio			0.246***			0.631***			0.114
			(0.074)			(0.235)			(0.086)
Listens to politics on radio*T1			-0.166			-0.770			0.235
			(0.154)			(0.558)			(0.198)
Listens to politics on radio*T2			-0.216*			0.304			0.338**
			(0.125)			(0.391)			(0.139)
Observations	275	275	275	274	274	274	275	275	275
Mean of DV for Control	0.840	0.840	0.840	1.124	1.124	1.124	0.444	0.444	0.444
I*T1=I*T2	0.006	0.954	0.090	0.622	0.224	4.752	0.926	0.057	0.244
I*T1=I*T2 *p-value*	0.939	0.329	0.764	0.430	0.636	0.029	0.336	0.812	0.621
B. Within Village									
T1: Report Card Only	0.108	0.055	0.153	0.006	-0.120	0.735	0.092	0.028	-0.052
	(0.091)	(0.083)	(0.167)	(0.271)	(0.246)	(0.501)	(0.119)	(0.109)	(0.217)
T2: Report Card and Flyer	-0.029	-0.081	0.035	-0.168	-0.018	-0.257	-0.132	-0.116	-0.133
	(0.119)	(0.100)	(0.201)	(0.352)	(0.294)	(0.595)	(0.156)	(0.131)	(0.262)
Reads English	0.184***			0.621***			0.266***		
	(0.071)			(0.209)			(0.093)		
Reads English*T1	-0.113			-0.316			-0.172		
	(0.132)			(0.388)			(0.172)		
Reads English*T2	-0.077			0.156			0.066		
	(0.142)			(0.418)			(0.185)		
Secondary School		0.097			0.617**			0.160	
		(0.084)			(0.249)			(0.111)	
Secondary School*T1		0.011			-0.113			-0.062	
		(0.160)			(0.471)			(0.210)	
Secondary School*T2		0.102			-0.028			0.190	
		(0.156)			(0.459)			(0.205)	
Listens to politics on radio			0.155			0.822**			0.232
			(0.114)			(0.347)			(0.148)
Listens to politics on radio*T1			-0.098			-0.968*			0.119
			(0.176)			(0.525)			(0.229)
Listens to politics on radio*T2			-0.079			0.392			0.120
			(0.208)			(0.617)			(0.271)
Observations	186	186	186	185	185	185	186	186	186
Mean of DV for Control	0.839	0.839	0.839	1.086	1.086	1.086	0.446	0.446	0.446
I*T1=I*T2	0.047	0.229	0.008	0.926	0.023	4.399	1.203	1.018	0.000
I*T1=I*T2 *p-value*	0.829	0.633	0.930	0.337	0.880	0.037	0.274	0.314	0.997

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, OLS constant and R-squared not shown. Full Sample Model: OLS with block-bootstrap standard errors. Within Village Model: OLS with village fixed effects, village coefficients not shown.

Table 7: Political Behavior Interactions

Dependent Variable	Contacted government official in the past month			Contacted politician in the past month			Follow-up on CDF project in the past month		
A. Full Sample									
T1: Report Card Only	-0.007	-0.062*	0.025	-0.016	-0.017	0.009	0.144***	0.133***	0.120
	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.077)
T2: Report Card and Flyer	-0.013	-0.038	-0.047	0.028	0.008	0.001	0.218***	0.224***	0.111***
	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.021)	(0.044)	(0.028)	(0.060)	(0.029)	(0.034)
Village Elder	0.325			0.026			0.142		
	(0.224)			(0.062)			(0.133)		
Village Elder*T1	-0.447**			-0.075			-0.083		
	(0.221)			(0.073)			(0.343)		
Village Elder*T2	-0.156			0.166			-0.062		
	(0.264)			(0.184)			(0.217)		
Public leader in household		0.042			-0.034			-0.034	
		(0.062)			(0.031)			(0.079)	
Public leader in household*T1		0.162			-0.020			0.042	
		(0.274)			(0.042)			(0.337)	
Public leader in household*T2		0.102			0.205***			-0.001	
		(0.081)			(0.059)			(0.106)	
Friends with public leader			0.146***			0.033			-0.021
			(0.043)			(0.037)			(0.053)
Friends with public leader*T1			-0.198			-0.098			0.062
			(0.156)			(0.066)			(0.170)
Friends with public leader*T2			0.130			0.176**			0.364***
			(0.090)			(0.069)			(0.091)
Observations	275	275	275	275	275	275	272	272	272
Mean of DV for Control	0.142	0.142	0.142	0.073	0.073	0.073	0.202	0.202	0.202
I*T1=I*T2	6.000	0.048	4.140	2.128	12.650	15.850	0.004	0.016	3.080
I*T1=I*T2 *p-value*	0.014	0.826	0.042	0.145	0.000	0.000	0.951	0.899	0.079
B. Within Village									
T1: Report Card Only	-0.037	-0.124	-0.011	-0.024	-0.030	0.003	0.103	0.045	0.035
	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.092)	(0.097)	(0.104)
T2: Report Card and Flyer	0.066	0.032	0.001	0.030	0.022	0.016	0.234**	0.227**	0.094
	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.072)	(0.110)	(0.114)	(0.121)
Village Elder	0.529***			-0.039			0.371*		
	(0.175)			(0.133)			(0.224)		
Village Elder*T1	-0.660**			-0.002			-0.308		
	(0.264)			(0.201)			(0.337)		
Village Elder*T2	-0.414*			0.372**			-0.295		
	(0.240)			(0.182)			(0.305)		
Public leader in household		-0.095			-0.107			-0.201	
		(0.100)			(0.075)			(0.126)	
Public leader in household*T1		0.316*			0.003			0.228	
		(0.170)			(0.128)			(0.215)	
Public leader in household*T2		0.274			0.285**			0.184	
		(0.168)			(0.126)			(0.212)	
Friends with public leader			0.087			0.043			-0.109
			(0.069)			(0.053)			(0.088)
Friends with public leader*T1			-0.192			-0.089			0.164
			(0.132)			(0.100)			(0.167)
Friends with public leader*T2			0.276**			0.193*			0.453**
			(0.138)			(0.105)			(0.175)
Observations	186	186	186	186	186	186	183	183	183
Mean of DV for Control	0.134	0.134	0.134	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.240	0.240	0.240
I*T1=I*T2	0.916	0.047	8.145	3.655	3.665	5.090	0.002	0.032	1.932
I*T1=I*T2 *p-value*	0.340	0.829	0.005	0.058	0.057	0.025	0.968	0.859	0.166

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, OLS constant and R-squared not shown. Full Sample Model: OLS with block-bootstrap standard errors. Within Village Model: OLS with village fixed effects, village coefficients not shown.

Table 8: Political Attitude Interactions

	Government Performance		Electoral Accountability	
	Perceived Corruption (% leakage)		Government/politics is a constraint to development	
Dependent Variable				
A. Full Sample				
T1: Report Card Only	-8.903**	-13.527**	0.055**	0.050**
	(4.105)	(6.407)	(0.028)	(0.022)
T2: Report Card and Flyer	-4.306	-1.559	-0.019	0.023
	(9.644)	(6.883)	(0.013)	(0.031)
Reads English	5.941**		0.008	
	(2.676)		(0.020)	
Reads English*T1	-2.691		0.035	
	(3.415)		(0.041)	
Reads English*T2	0.863		0.029	
	(9.196)		(0.035)	
Secondary School		5.608		0.058
		(3.968)		(0.035)
Secondary School*T1		17.972*		0.107
		(9.692)		(0.133)
Secondary School*T2		-6.097		-0.088*
		(10.078)		(0.046)
Observations	263	263	275	275
Mean of DV for Control	77.144	77.144	0.033	0.033
I*T1=I*T2	0.108	5.475	0.027	1.810
I*T1=I*T2 *p-value*	0.742	0.019	0.869	0.179
B. Within Village				
T1: Report Card Only	-4.581	-10.419	0.020	0.020
	(8.551)	(7.578)	(0.052)	(0.046)
T2: Report Card and Flyer	0.022	-4.977	-0.041	0.020
	(11.192)	(9.375)	(0.068)	(0.055)
Reads English	5.961		-0.008	
	(6.565)		(0.040)	
Reads English*T1	-3.427		0.050	
	(12.197)		(0.075)	
Reads English*T2	-8.950		0.060	
	(13.544)		(0.081)	
Secondary School		3.535		0.088*
		(7.646)		(0.047)
Secondary School*T1		19.858		0.098
		(14.478)		(0.088)
Secondary School*T2		1.282		-0.127
		(14.667)		(0.086)
Observations	179	179	186	186
Mean of DV for Control	75.469	75.469	0.043	0.043
I*T1=I*T2	0.123	1.108	0.010	4.618
I*T1=I*T2 *p-value*	0.727	0.294	0.920	0.033

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, OLS constant and R-squared not shown. Full Sample Model: OLS with block-bootstrap standard errors. Within Village Model: OLS with village fixed effects, village coefficients not shown.

Figure 1



Figure 2



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Appendix

CODING RULES:

1. MPask

Public goods: Where the respondent asks for anything pertaining to non-excludable goods or services. Had to specify one of the following:

- Hospital or dispensary or health/medical center
- Water
- School
- Electricity
- Road or tarmac

Private goods: Where the respondent asks for personal assistance or for money/funding, which would primarily benefit an individual household.

- Asks about money and finances
- Asks about bursaries (typically considered to be a political favor)
- Asks for money
- Asks for personal help for the individual or individual's household

Policy: Where the respondent asks about policies regarding macroeconomic issues (unemployment, inflation, market regulation), national public policy (contract teacher pay, agricultural subsidies), or security policies (land grabbing, security, alcohol regulation).

- Employment or unemployment, job losses
- Inflation or rising prices
- Land or property grabbing
- Agriculture inputs
- Crop prices
- Security
- Alcohol regulation
- Teacher's strike

2. Individual Constraints:
Money: Individual constraints from lack of personal resources.
Respondent specifies lack of money, funds or finances

Collection Action: Individual constraints from lack of cooperation with others within the community
Lack of communication
Lack of unity
Uncooperative community/villagers
Lack of trust

Government/politics: Individual constraints from factors to do with politics, leadership, or policy outcomes.
Corrupt
Politics
Leaders
Unemployment
Security
Poor public services
Lack of infrastructure: electricity and roads

3. Did not read:
If enumerator recorded did not read for questions 55, 56, or in the final comment section.

4. Open-ended interviews
--Note that there is higher likelihood of interviewer contamination here.

A. Reason for voting: based upon response to question 25a.

- Choice of Leader:
  - Cites the election of leaders as reason for voting.
- Development/improved livelihood:
  - Cites desire for development as reason for voting.
- Democratic Right:
  - Says they voted because it is a right.

Not coded, but alternative responses:

- Decisive vote:
  - Believed their vote could be decisive in the final outcome (HHID 111, 814)
- Taken by others to vote:
  - Not own choice, was taken by a vehicle to vote (HHID 110, 113)
- Registration issues:
  - Lacked identity card or registration (HHID 114, 809, 911)

B. How their MP could secure respondent's vote: based upon response to question 42.

- Retrospective:
  - Cites past performance or what the MP has done/seeing actions, as criteria for the MP to secure respondent's vote.
- Prospective:
  - Cites future performance, or what MP promises to do/will do, as criteria for the MP to secure their vote.
- Private transfers:
  - Asks for targeted transfer (excludable, non-public) from MP.
- Candidate trait:
  - Looks for specific individual characteristic of MP.

Materials Distributed

Sample pages from the CDF Report Card

NTA Public Participation Flyer

Project Number	50	**Picture Unavailable**
Constituency	Kangema	
Project Name	Kibutha primary school	
Project Activity	Renovation of 1 classroom.	
Location/Ward	Kanyenya-ini	
MPs Name	John Michuki	
Project Status	Does not exist	
Date of Visit	03/03/09	
Total Funds Awarded to Date	600,000	
Total Funds Spent to Date	Nil	
Total Unaccounted Funds	600,000	
Technical Performance Score	0%	
Project Classification	E	
Comments	Although the CDF status report indicates that Kshs 462,800 has been spent on the project, the monitoring exercise revealed that the project had not been implemented. In a nutshell, the project does not exist.	

Project Number	30	
Constituency	Kangema	
Project Name	Njii Ithatu polytechnic	
Project Activity	Construction of 3 classes	
Location/Ward	Iyego	
MPs Name	John Michuki	
Project Status	Complete	
Date of Visit	09/03/09	
Total Funds Awarded to Date	2,668,000	
Total Funds Spent to Date	2,668,000	
Total Unaccounted Funds	0	
Technical Performance Score	70%	
Project Classification	A	
Comments	The classes have been well constructed and represent value for money. There is community satisfaction with the project although it is not operational yet.	

Project Number	40	
Constituency	Kangema	
Project Name	Kahiti primary school	
Project Activity	Renovation of floors, painting of roofs and walls	
Location/Ward	Iyego	
MPs Name	John Michuki	
Project Status	Complete	
Date of Visit	09/03/09	
Total Funds Awarded to Date	910,896	
Total Funds Spent to Date	689,000	
Total Unaccounted Funds	221,896	
Technical Performance Score	63%	
Project Classification	A	
Comments	The renovation work at the facility is well undertaken using quality materials and the workmanship is good. The project represents value for taxpayers' money.	

Project Number	35	
Constituency	Kangema	
Project Name	Tuthu polytechnic	
Project Activity	Renovation of 9 classrooms	
Location/Ward	Kiruri	
MPs Name	John Michuki	
Project Status	Incomplete	
Date of Visit	07/03/09	
Total Funds Awarded to Date	1,135,000	
Total Funds Spent to Date	1,135,000	
Total Unaccounted Funds	0	
Technical Performance Score	37%	
Project Classification	B	
Comments	The renovation work at the facility has been poorly undertaken. Poor quality of materials has been used and the workmanship is wanting. It is a poorly implemented project.	

Project Number	45	
Constituency	Kangema	
Project Name	Karurumo secondary school	
Project Activity	Construction of laboratory	
Location/Ward	Kiruri	
MPs Name	John Michuki	
Project Status	Incomplete	
Date of Visit	07/03/09	
Total Funds Awarded to Date	2,505,202	
Total Funds Spent to Date	2,505,202	
Total Unaccounted Funds	0	
Technical Performance Score	40%	
Project Classification	B	
Comments	Poorly implemented. The amount spent on the laboratory building which is yet to be completed is too high compared to the work already undertaken. No value for money spent on this project.	

National Taxpayers Association (NTA)

CDF

Public Participation

Access to Information

Access to Services

AUGUST 2011

Introduction

The National Taxpayers Association (NTA) is an independent, non-partisan organization focused on promoting good governance in Kenya through citizen empowerment, enhancing public service delivery and partnership building. Since 2006 NTA has implemented programmes focused on building citizen demand and strengthening delivery of public services. It has achieved this through the development of social accountability tools, Citizen Report Cards (CRCs), civic awareness, building the capacity of citizens and initiating partnerships with the government agencies and non-state actors.

NTA envisions an accountable, citizen-responsive government delivering quality services. Its mission is to promote accountable, effective and efficient collection and utilization of public resources through citizen empowerment, enhancing public service delivery and partnership building.

CDF: How does it work?

President Mwai Kibaki first became President in 2002 aided by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) bringing to an end KANU's one-party dominance since Independence in 1963. The NARC government promised to devolve power away from the center and to share political power among Kenya's diverse groups. With this hopes the CDF was established in 2003 through an Act of the Parliament with the goal of fighting poverty at the grassroots level. To achieve this goal the CDF ensures that constituencies receive 2.5% of the Government annual ordinary revenue, besides monies to be received from other sources by the CDF Board.

In total, the government allocated 19 USD million to the CDF fund for the financial year 2003/4 followed by 83 USD million in 2004/5, 107 USD million in 2005/6, 148 USD million on the year previous to election that is 2006/7, 149 USD million to the newly elected parliament in the 2007/8, 166 USD million in 2010/2011 and proposed 284 USD million in financial year 2011/2012 that incorporates about 210 USD thousand per constituency to complete stalled/ongoing projects. The increase in the value of the CDF allocation reflects the economic recovery of Kenya. In 2002, when Kibaki took over as president the Kenyan economy was stagnant and in the year ahead of the election Kenya was growing at 6.1%.

The CDF fund was first distributed equally among the 210 constituencies but since 2004 the central government has committed to use an allocation formula to distribute the development funds such that the government may not renege its obligation as happened in previous decentralization programs. This formula also aims to provide a fairly uniform fund to each constituency, but some allowance is made for poverty levels, such that the poorest constituencies receive slightly more resources. According to the CDF Act this formula estimates that 75% of the net available fund is distributed equally among all 210 constituencies, whilst 25% of the net available fund is distributed according to a weighted value of the constituency's contribution to national poverty. The weighting factor applied to the constituency contribution to poverty is the ratio of urban-rural poor population derived from the 1999 population and housing census. This weight favors rural areas by a factor of 0.23 to urban areas. The net available CDF fund is the total CDF allocation after netting out 3% for an administrative budget and 5% for a so called constituency emergency budget.

CDF is established through the Constituencies Development Fund Act, 2003 and amended in 2007.

The CDF Act provides that "The provisions of this Act shall apply, as more specifically provided for in the Act, and shall ensure that a specific portion of the national annual budget is devoted to the constituencies for purposes of development and in particular in the fight against poverty at the constituency level."

PART II of the CDF Act discusses the establishment of the Constituencies Development Fund and provides that;

4. (1) There is established a Fund to be known as the Constituencies Development Fund (in this Act referred to as the "Fund") which shall be administered by the Board.

(2) There shall be paid into the Fund -

(a) an amount of money equal to not less than 2.5% (two and a half per centum) of all the Government ordinary revenue collected in every financial year; and,

(b) any moneys accruing to or received by the Board from any other source.

(3) The expenditure from the Fund shall be on the basis and limited to the annual budget which shall be submitted to the Minister by various constituencies in accordance with the Act.

(4).There shall be paid out of the Fund payments in respect of any expenses incurred in pursuance of the provisions of the Act.

TYPES OF CDF PROJECTS

PART IV of the CDF Act identifies the types of projects as follows

Under **Article 21 (1) of the CDF Act** - Projects under this Act shall be community based in order to ensure that the prospective benefits are available to a widespread cross-section of the inhabitants of a particular area.

(2) Any funding under this Act shall be for a complete project or a defined phase, unit or element of a project and may include the acquisition of land and buildings.

(3) All projects shall be development projects and may include costs related to studies, planning and design or other technical input for the project but shall not include recurrent costs of a facility other than as provided for in subsections (9), (10) and (11).

(4) Funds provided under this Act shall not be used for the purpose of supporting political bodies or political activities or for supporting religious bodies or religious activities.

(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (4), the Constituency Development Fund Committee may identify a religious body or organization as an appropriate specialized agency for purposes of section 11 with regard to emergency support

(7) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (3), up to a maximum of three per centum of the total annual allocation for the constituency may be used for administration and such use shall be listed in the Second Schedule as a project.

(8) Development projects may include the acquisition of vehicles, machinery and other equipment.

(9) An appropriate amount not more than three per centum of a constituency's annual allocation may be allocated to recurrent expenses of vehicles, equipment and machinery and be listed as a project provided that such items do not belong to a separate entity.

(10) Sports activities may be considered as development projects for purposes of the Act but shall exclude cash awards provided that the allocation to such activities does not exceed two per centum of the total allocation of the constituency in that financial year.
(11) Monitoring and evaluation of ongoing projects and capacity building of various operatives may be considered as a development project provided that not more than two per centum shall be allocated for this purpose.
(12) Environmental activities may be considered as development projects for purposes of the Act provided that the allocation to such activities does not exceed two per centum of the total allocation of the constituency in that financial year.

NUMBER OF PROJECTS
Under Part 4, Article 22. (1) of the Act cites the number of projects as follows:
The number of projects to be included in the Standard Constituency Projects Submission Form specified in the Second Schedule shall be a minimum of five and a maximum of **twenty five** for every constituency in each financial year.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SELECTION OF PROJECTS
Under Part 4 of the CDF Act Article 23 (2) The elected member of Parliament for every constituency shall, within the first year of a new parliament and at least once every two years thereafter, convene locational meetings in the constituency to deliberate on development matters in the location, the constituency and the district.
(3) Each location shall come up with a list of priority projects to be submitted to the Constituency Development Committee.
(4) The Constituency Development Committee shall deliberate on project proposals from all the locations in the constituency and any other projects which the Committee considers beneficial to the constituency, including joint efforts with other constituencies, then draw up a priority projects list both immediate and long term, out of which the list of projects to be submitted to Parliament in accordance with section 12 shall be drawn.
(5) The elected Member of Parliament for every constituency shall be chairperson of the Constituency Development Committee unless he or she opts out in which case the Committee shall elect one amongst themselves to be the Chairperson.

COMPOSITION OF THE CDF COMMITTEE

Composition of the Constituency Development Committee
Under Part 4 Article 23.(1) There shall be a Constituency Development Committee for every constituency, which shall be constituted and convened by the elected Member of Parliament within the first thirty days of a new Parliament sixty days of a new Parliament or a by election and shall have a maximum of fifteen members, comprising of The Constituencies Development Fund Act, 2003
(a) the elected member of Parliament ;
(b) two councilors in the constituency;
(c) one district officer in the constituency;
(d) two persons representing religious organizations in the constituency;
(e) two men representatives from the constituency;
(f) two women representatives from the constituency;
(g) one person representing the youth from the constituency;

(h) one person nominated from among the active NGOs in the area if any;
(i) a maximum of three other persons from the constituency such that the total number does not exceed fifteen;
(j) an officer of the Board seconded to the Constituency Development Fund Committee by the Board, who shall be ex-officio.

NTA observations on CDF

- The CDF Act gives too much power to MPs and this has been abused.
- The CDF Committee members tend to be unqualified cronies of the MP.
- The Project Management Committees in most instances do not have project management capacity and skills to implement projects
- The success of CDF in a few areas has largely dependent on the quality of the leader in office
- There's lack of proper oversight mechanisms with a toothless and compromised CDF Board with constant threats of disbandment whenever it probes mismanagement.
- KACC lacks capacity to investigate all cases of corruption leading to impunity by MPs and CDF Committees.
- About 75% of CDF is currently well used attributed to increasing knowledge by citizens, the vocal anti-corruption drive and the real fear of being voted out as an MP as a direct result of CDF mismanagement.
- In this year's budget KSh.17.8 million has been allocated per constituency to complete ongoing CDF projects. This may suggest a planned termination or restructuring of the fund. The increased allocation totals to about KSh.22.9 billion to CDF. We have not been told specifically how many projects in each constituency need this funds visa-a-vie what has been allocated to the same projects through the regular allocations. We fear the funds will be pocket money for campaigns in 2012. There is an urgent need to ensure adequate control and accountability mechanisms are in place to curb mismanagement, ineptitude and abuse of funds now and going into the devolved system.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS REGARDING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND SERVICES

I PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Chapter 2 on The Republic - **Article 10(2) (a)** – On national values and principles of governance discusses patriotism, national unity, sharing and devolution of power, the rule of law, democracy and **participation of the people**;

Chapter 8 on Legislature (Part 5) - **Article 118 (b)** — Public access and participation - facilitate public participation and involvement in the legislative and other business of Parliament and its committees.

Chapter 11 on Devolved Government **Part 1** — Objects and principles of devolved government

Article 174 The objects of the devolution of government are

(a) to promote democratic and accountable exercise of power;
(b) to foster national unity by recognising diversity;

(c) to give powers of self-governance to the people and **enhance the participation of the people in the exercise of the powers of the State and in making decisions affecting them;**

Chapter 11 on Devolved Government **- Part 7** looks at Public participation and county assembly powers, privileges and immunities
Article 196 (1) A county assembly shall—

(a) conduct its business in an open manner, and hold its sittings and those of its committees, in public; and
(b) facilitate **public participation and involvement** in the legislative and other business of the assembly and its committees**.**

Chapter 12 on Public Finance **- Part I—**Principles and framework of public finance
Article 201 discusses Principles of public finance

(a) there shall be openness and accountability, including **public** participation in financial matters;

Fourth Schedule *(Article 185 (1))* Distribution of functions between the National Government and the County Governments **- Part 2—County Governments – Section 14** – Talks of ensuring and coordinating the participation of communities and locations in governance at the local level and assisting communities and locations to develop the administrative capacity for the effective exercise of the functions and powers and **participation in governance at the local level**.

II ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Chapter 4 - The Bill of Rights - Part 2—Rights and fundamental freedoms

Article 35—Access to information

(1) Every citizen has the right of access to—

(a) **information held by the State**; and

(b) **Information held by another person and required for the exercise or protection of any right or fundamental freedom**.

(2) Every person has the right to the correction or deletion of untrue or misleading information that affects the person.

(3) The State shall publish and publicise any important information affecting the nation.

III ACCESS TO SERVICES

Chapter 2 on The Republic - Article 6 - Devolution and access to services - (3) A national State organ shall **ensure reasonable access to its services** in all parts of the Republic, so far as it is appropriate to do so having regard to the nature of the service.

Article 191 on Conflict of Laws - Section (3) (c) (v) cites the promotion of equal opportunity and equal access to government services.